Caps Without Foundations?
REVIEW
A Post-Growth Dissertation on Income and Wealth Limits – And What It Overlooks About Money and Land
It is rare for an academic work to be both intellectually ambitious and empirically grounded, and to advocate radical ideas while also charting pragmatic paths towards their realisation. Martin François’s doctoral dissertation on income and wealth caps in post-growth societies is a prime example of this. For readers interested in monetary and land reform, it provides valuable insights while also highlighting a notable oversight.
The Diagnosis: Accumulation as the Root of Inequality
François picks up where Thomas Piketty left off. Piketty’s famous formula, r > g (the return on capital exceeds economic growth), leads to wealth concentration in the long run. François agrees with this analysis, but takes it a step further. What if growth itself is no longer an option? In a world of shrinking or stagnating economies, whether due to ecological considerations or resource depletion, the question of inequality becomes existential.
The dissertation convincingly demonstrates that the usual proposals in post-growth literature – moderate wealth taxes, progressive income taxation up to 50 percent – are insufficient to combat inequality in zero-growth scenarios. In the macroeconomic simulations François draws upon, these instruments only work with positive growth. Once the economy stagnates, the wealthy continue to gain at the expense of workers – unless more radical measures are employed.
The dissertation convincingly demonstrates that the proposals typically made in post-growth literature, such as moderate wealth taxes and progressive income taxation of up to 50 per cent, are insufficient to combat inequality in zero-growth scenarios. In the macroeconomic simulations that François draws upon, these measures only work in a context of positive growth. Once the economy stagnates, the wealthy continue to prosper at the expense of workers, unless more radical measures are employed.
François identifies the logic of capitalist accumulation – ‚accumulate or die’ – as the structural core of the problem. He argues that extreme wealth is not only socially unjust, but also ecologically destructive; the richest one percent cause more CO₂ emissions than the poorest half of humanity. Furthermore, wealth hinders political transformation as the super-rich exert disproportionate influence on democratic processes.
The Solution: Caps as an „Archimedean Point“
For François, income and wealth caps represent a paradigm shift, not just a tax increase. He distinguishes two policy paradigms: In the capitalist paradigm, poverty is the problem (not wealth), growth is the means and redistribution is the goal. In the post-growth paradigm, however, poverty and extreme wealth are two sides of the same coin, and both must be addressed because, in a stagnating economy, they are directly coupled — when one person becomes richer, another becomes poorer.
The dissertation proposes a seven-parameter analytical framework for designing cap policies: motive, scope, threshold level, target group, instruments, use of revenues and embedded policy package. Historical case studies, ranging from Roman agrarian reform to Huey Long’s ‚Share Our Wealth’ movement and Roosevelt’s proposal for a 100 per cent tax on income above $25,000, demonstrate that such concepts are not utopian and can gain political traction during times of crisis.
The Empirical Surprise: Radical Ideas with Majority Support
Perhaps the most important contribution of this work is its empirical nature. Previous surveys had shown that the idea of capping income was rejected by the public – with approval ratings of only around 25 per cent in the Netherlands and Sweden. However, François’s qualitative and quantitative studies in Belgium (50 interviews and a representative survey of 1,262 participants) paint a completely different picture.
The result: 48 per cent of Belgians support the idea of a maximum income; only 37 per cent oppose it. Support rises to 65 percent for well-designed proposals, such as a threshold of €500,000 gross annual income with a 90 percent tax rate.
François’ conclusion is significant: the apparent unpopularity of such measures does not lie in the idea itself, but rather in poor policy design and a lack of understanding. When respondents are given a detailed description, approval doubles. The implications of this extend far beyond the maximum income. Perhaps other ‚radical’ ideas, such as individual flight quotas, meat taxes or monetary and land reforms, are more popular than previously thought if they are properly explained.
The Blind Spot: Where Are Money and Land?
This is where the critical appreciation begins for those familiar with heterodox economics. François identifies r > g as the problem, yet fails to ask why r is structurally greater than g. For over a century, the Georgist and monetary reform traditions have offered an answer: the liquidity premium of money (interest as the price for forgoing liquidity) and land rent (unearned income from land ownership) are the institutional roots of accumulation.
The 280-page dissertation makes no mention of money creation by commercial banks, Modern Monetary Theory, Silvio Gesell, demurrage currency, land value taxation, Henry George or Georgism, or the distinction between ‚earned’ and ‚unearned’ income. The word ‚interest’ appears 68 times, but almost exclusively in the sense of ‚research interest’, rather than as an economic category.
This gap is indicative of the broader post-growth discourse, which consistently overlooks monetary institutions. François treats ‚wealth’ as a homogeneous entity, failing to distinguish between productive capital, financial assets and land ownership. However, this distinction is important: an entrepreneur who becomes wealthy through innovation is in a different ethical and economic category to a landowner who profits from rising land prices without contributing anything.
Symptom or Cause?
One could compare François’ approach to that of a doctor who treats the fever but does not examine the infection. Income and wealth caps are instruments of redistribution – they correct what went wrong in the primary distribution after the fact. In contrast, monetary and land reforms are pre-distribution instruments, changing the conditions under which income and wealth are generated so that extreme inequality does not arise in the first place.
Specifically:
A land value tax would capture the unearned land rent. This has historically been a major driver of wealth concentration. François only ever uses the terms ‚real estate’ and ‚housing’ descriptively, never as an independent problem category.
A demurrage fee on money would eliminate the liquidity premium and thus reduce the extent to which interest redistributes wealth from labour to capital. This would directly affect the variable r in Piketty’s formula.
Both reforms would alter the primary distribution, meaning that income caps would either need to be less drastic, or could even become unnecessary. They would not limit accumulation, but transform it.
Why This Blind Spot?
François’ omission is not an individual weakness, but rather reflects a broader tendency. Ecological economics, the field in which he specialises, has historically had little contact with heterodox monetary theory. Piketty, on whom François relies heavily, treats the monetary system as an established institution rather than an area for reform. Furthermore, the post-growth movement focuses on real quantities, such as resource consumption and CO₂, rather than monetary mechanisms.
While this is understandable, it is also unsatisfying. François’ own theoretical reference, Herman Daly’s steady-state economics, has historical links to Georgist and monetary reform traditions. Daly cited Gesell positively and advocated institutional limits on income and wealth. However, this line of tradition has largely been severed in modern post-growth literature.
Building Bridges: Complementarity Rather Than Competition
The critique should not be misunderstood. François’ work is not a misstep, but rather an incomplete map. His diagnosis of the logic of capitalist accumulation is fully compatible with Georgist and monetary reform analyses. His call for a paradigm shift — from ‚treating the fever’ to ‚curing the infection’ — paves the way for deeper structural reforms. Furthermore, his empirical methods offer a model for researching public acceptance of monetary and land reforms.
The central question is how these approaches can be combined.
One possible approach is as follows: François’ policy matrix (page 239) lists concrete areas of action for civil society, businesses and the state. However, monetary and land reform are completely absent – these could be added as upstream measures to either enforce or replace income caps.
Another approach: François shows that well-explained radical ideas can achieve majority support. His exploratory mixed-methods research – qualitative interviews followed by quantitative vignette experiments – could be directly applied to land value taxation or monetary reform. How high would acceptance of a land value tax be with a detailed explanation? How would approval vary depending on whether one speaks of „property tax,“ „land rent,“ or „unearned income“?
An Invitation to Dialogue
François describes himself as a ‚radical bricoleur’ – someone who seeks profound change yet works pragmatically within existing institutions. He explicitly situates his work within the ‚deconstruction phase’ of a paradigm shift, with the aim of developing ‚intellectual ammunition’ with which to critique the existing system.
In this spirit, I would like to propose a dialogue. The monetary and land reform movement could demonstrate to the post-growth debate that its diagnosis of accumulation as the problem runs deeper than is currently recognised. It could demonstrate that monetary mechanisms and land rent are the transmission belts through which r > g operates. Furthermore, it could argue that income caps without monetary and land reform are a Sisyphean struggle: one merely skims off what is constantly reforming.
Conversely, the monetary and land reform movement could learn from François’s approach: his empirical methods for acceptance research, his focus on policy design and his strategic considerations for gradual implementation. Might a land value tax be more popular if it started with high exemptions? Could demurrage be communicated more effectively if it were framed as a ‚circulation fee’ rather than ’negative interest’?
Conclusion: A Necessary but Incomplete Work
Martin François has produced an impressive dissertation that brings income and wealth caps into the realm of political possibility. His work is theoretically well-founded, empirically innovative and strategically astute. For the post-growth movement, it is a milestone.
For those interested in monetary and land reform, it is both an invitation and a challenge. The invitation is to recognise that here is academic work combining structural thinking and radical reform ideas with empirical research — a model for our own efforts. The challenge is this: why isn’t the post-growth movement aware of our ideas? How can we build bridges?
François concludes his work with a quote from Victor Hugo: ‚On résiste à l’invasion des armées; on ne résiste pas à l’invasion des idées’ – ‚One resists the invasion of armies, but not the invasion of ideas’. Perhaps it is time for the ideas of Gesell and George to enter the academic debate once more. François’ dissertation shows that the doors are open.
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